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Dear Mr. Butler: 
Pursuant to Rule 24 (j) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court, Respondents Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. and Scott Olsen 
wish to cite to the Court its recent decision in Chapman v. Primary 
Children's Hospital, et al., No. 860392, filed December 27, 1989. 
In that case, as in this case, plaintiffs made a claim against 
Scott Wetzel Services that statements made by a Scott Wetzel repre-
sentative amounted to fraudulent concealment of medical malpractice. 
In Chapman, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
In the case of defendants Scott Wetzel Company and 
The Home Group, we hold that, even if the Chapmans1 
claims are take as true, no fiduciary relationship 
existed between the Chapmans and these defendants 
sufficient to give rise to a duty of disclosure... 
However, our cases dealing with fraudulent concealment 
indicate that neither material omissions nor fraudulent 
affirmative statements are actionable absent a duty 
to speak the truth. See Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. 
Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1980); Elder v. 
Clawson, 14 Utah 2d 379, 382, 384 P.2d 802, 804 (1963). 
In this case, the Scott Wetzel Company was under an 
independent contract to Intermoutain Health Care— 
the parent corporation of Primary Children's 
Hospital—to investigate accident claims involving 
Intermountain Health Care; it had no responsibility 
to the Chapmans. 
Although the issues on appeal in the Atkinson case have 
so far centered around the release signed by appellants, various 
statute of limitations defenses and collateral estoppel, it is 
axiomatic that the ruling in the Chapman case is directly on point 
and relieves Scott Wetzel Services and Scott Olsen from any fidu-
ciary relationship or duty of disclosure to the appellants in 
Atkinson, Therefore, appellants have no cause of action against 
Scott Wetzel Services and Scott Olsen and the summary judgment 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 5th day of January, 1990. 
RAY, QOINNEY & NEBEKER 
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Attorneys for Respondents Scott 
Wetzel Services, Inc. and 
Scott Olsen 
cc: Robert J. DeBry 
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
IHC Hospitals, Inc., a/k/a Intermountain Health Care 
("IHC") opposes the petition for rehearing. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the 
Petition for Rehearing and of the appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(j); see also Rule 35, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
FACTS 
Roger Atkinson and Polly Atkinson, individually and 
as guardians ad litem for Chad Atkinson (collectively, the 
"Atkinsons"), alleged (1) that the settlement of approximately 
$1 million for Chad Atkinson, approved more than four years 
before the Atkinsons brought this suit, should be reopened or 
reconsidered and (2) for alleged attorney malpractice (see 
Record ["R."] 415-18). The trial court granted summary judg-
ment, and this Court unanimously affirmed. Atkinson v. IHC 
Hospitals, 138 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (S.Ct. 1990). 
ARGUMENT 
I. NO ERROR OF LAW HAS BEEN MADE; 
NO ERROR WILL BE REPEATED. 
Quoting limited portions of this Courtfs opinion, the 
Atkinsons assert that this Court has overlooked the mandate of 
the Legislature that a court must "determine[]" that a trans-
action is in the best interests of the protected person. Utah 
Code Ann. § 75-5-409(2). Careful review of the probate court 
opinion, this Court's opinion, the statute and the transcript 
of the proceedings of the probate court2 reveals no error. 
The probate court had the text of the settlement 
. 3 
terms and release available to review and the parents to ques-
tion about their understanding of the terms. The probate court 
was adequately and properly apprised. Even the Atkinsons1 
partial quotation, with significant ellipses, from this Court's 
opinion does not impose new standards or shirk from statutory 
responsibilities. There is no error of law which may be 
repeated to the detriment of "hundreds" of future litigants. 
After quoting 42 Am. Jur.2d Infants, § 154 (1969) and 
referring to Kansas and Tennessee cases4 about evaluating 
settlements of infants' claims, the only "evidence" which the 
Atkinsons quote to try to demonstrate that the probate proceed-
ings were inadequate is one question addressed to Judge Fish-
ier at his deposition. He answered that he did not evaluate 
the underlying claim against IHC. (Fishier Dep. at 51.) 
A copy of the probate court's decision is attached as 
Addendum F to the brief on appeal of Respondents Morgan and 
Morgan, Scally & Reading (the "Morgan Brief"). 
2
 See Transcript of Settlement, Fishier, J., July 22, 
1983 ("Tr.") attached as Addendum A to Morgan Brief. 
3
 Addenda C, D and K to Morgan Brief. 
4
 Western Life Ins. Co. v. Nanney, 290 F.Supp. 687 (CD. 
Tenn 1968) ; Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Lasca, 99 P. 616 (Kan. 
1909). Petitioners also refer to Perry v. Umberger, 65 P.2d 
280 (Kan. 1909). 
2 
Neither Am.Jur.2d nor the cited cases require an 
evaluation of the underlying claim — this supposed requirement 
is imposed only by the Atkinsons in their argument. The 
factors enumerated by the cited authorities were all well-
covered by Judge Fishier's review of the nature of the injury 
(brain damage), the amount recovered ($900,000 [guaranteed]5), 
the fact that both Mr. and Mrs. Atkinson believed the child had 
a claim against IHC, their understanding that they could not 
sue IHC again regardless of changes in the child's condition 
and the terms and conditions of the settlement and recovery, 
which provided, in part, that the child's injuries "are or may 
be permanent and progressive and that recovery therefrom is 
uncertain and indefinite. . . . " (Addendum C to Morgan Brief.) 
The probate judge was entitled to consider whether 
the parents thought the settlement reasonable in making his own 
determination, but that is not, as the Atkinsons imply, the 
only thing he considered. The judge was also entitled to 
impose conditions for the child's interests — which he did by 
requiring the parents to be bonded and to submit annual 
reports. Judge Fishier stated in his affidavit: 
Among other things the Court verified with 
the parents that they did not intend to 
obtain an attorney and that they had con-
5
 The settlement guarantees $900,000 plus certain free 
medical care for the child. If the child lives to age 65, the 
settlement will be worth at least $1.28 million. IHC has 
complied with the settlement requirements and has made and 
continues to make timely payments. 
3 
suited with an outside lawyer, (see page 2 
of the transcript, lines 7 thru 14 [sic].) 
7. The affiant ascertained that both par-
ents desired to complete the settlement as 
they had agreed with Intermountain Health 
Care, Inc., and that they felt that it was 
in the best interest of the child and them-
selves, and that upon hearing their testi-
mony, the Court concluded that it was in 
the interest of the minor and the parents 
to complete the settlement terms which had 
been agreed between the parties. 
Fishier Affidavit, Addendum P to Morgan Brief, emphasis added. 
Moreover, the Petition for Appointment of Conservator 
and Order to Approve Settlement recited that the "child sus-
tained accidental injuries while in the care" of an IHC hospi-
tal and that the injuries from a plugged breathing tube 
"involved brain damage, to an extent which has not been ascer-
tained at this time. . . . " (Addendum B to Morgan Brief.) 
Judge Fishier had ample information before him. 
Nothing in the proceedings deprived the child of the 
benefit of some $900,000 for his brain damage, free medical 
care (which has been extensive), funds for education. The 
parents also received money. Every reasonable precaution was 
taken to assure that the funds would be used for the child in 
accord with the structured settlement. 
It is the Atkinsons who err by trying to assert that 
approval was granted without, for example, consideration of the 
settlement agreement and release, which they brought to the 
4 
probate court. As this Court correctly concluded, everything 
was done in a jurisprudential manner. 
II. THE PETITIONERS1 CONTENTIONS AND 
ARGUMENTS LACK MERIT. 
1. The Parents1 Age Is Irrelevant. 
The Atkinsons claim that their age and recently 
alleged illiteracy at the time the settlement was approved 
require new proceedings. Mr. Atkinson, the father, was then 
19, having reached his majority. He was legally competent to 
vote, to enlist in the military, to marry and to have left 
compulsory schooling. His parents no longer had any obligation 
to support him. He was old enough to be appointed as the 
guardian of his child and to be trusted to manage, together 
with his wife, approximately $1 million in benefits and pay-
ments for his child. He had a tenth-grade education but now 
asserts, without proof, that he was barely able to read. The 
law imposes no literacy test on marrying, on fathering, or on 
parenting.7 
See, inter alia, United States Constitution, Amendment 
XXVI, Utah Code Ann. §§ 53A-11-101, 78-45-3. 
7
 The Court specifically asked Mrs. Atkinson if she 
understood that she would have no future claim against IHC even 
if the child's condition worsened, and she said she did. (Tr. 
at 2.) Significantly, the Atkinsons allege only Mr. Atkin-
son's near illiteracy, avoiding the question whether Mrs. 
Atkinson was truthful when she said she understood. Mr. 
Atkinson was able to answer oral questions, showing his per-
sonal understanding of the questions asked. (Tr. at 3-4.) 
5 
Mrs. Atkinson, aged 16, was a married woman, willing 
to give birth and willing to apply for and accept the court-
ordered guardianship (with her husband) of her child. She is 
the beneficiary of years of effort by women to be recognized as 
persons, not chattel, under the law.8 The Court should not 
ignore laws according rights to women. This is not the case 
nor the time to reverse statute and precedent. The Atkinsons1 
allegations about age and illiteracy are not persuasive and do 
not justify rehearing. 
No one ever questioned the Atkinsons1 right as par-
ents to keep their child, nor have there been any allegations 
of their inability to serve as his parents and his legal guard-
ians or to provide his daily nurture. Had there been no injury 
to their child, the law would have had no concern with his 
care, unless they violated child support or criminal statutes.9 
The law permits young and old parents to raise their 
children; it should not, because of the Atkinsons1 age, favor 
them with relief from a settlement they supported in court. 
The Atkinsons should not benefit from age discrimination. The 
See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. 63-3-1 et seq. 
Indeed, if persons of their respective ages had had a 
child born out of wedlock, they could have decided whether to 
marry, whether to place the child for adoption (terminating all 
parental rights) or whether one or the other would retain 
custody with the possibility of receiving support from and 
according visitation to the other. 
6 
Atkinsons cannot be permitted to pick and choose their rights, 
responsibilities and competencies. 
Moreover, the Atkinsons have failed to show any 
causal connection between their ages or their alleged illiter-
acy and the value of the settlement; there is no evidence that, 
had they been older or more literate, the settlement would have 
been larger or different. There is no evidence that the 
settlement itself is inadequate or unreasonable or could have 
been so discerned or proven. 
2. The Atkinsons Were Advised As Thev Chose» 
Mr. Atkinson's father, George Atkinson, described 
himself as a union negotiator, chosen to negotiate on behalf of 
his union with a major mining corporation. He offered a propo-
sal of settlement which was rejected by IHC. The fact that the 
Atkinsons did not hold out for the terms of George Atkinson's 
alternative proposal does not mean that they failed to follow 
George Atkinson's advice or did not have its benefit. 
Even the most experienced and competent of lawyers, 
arbiters and negotiators win some cases and lose others. The 
fact that George Atkinson's proposal did not prevail does not 
mean that a different proposal was unfair or fraudulent. Most 
negotiators ask for more than they expect; it is only specula-
tion when the Atkinsons now argue they acted without George 
Atkinson's advice because his views did not prevail. 
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No one has reviewed (and no one needs to review) the 
reasonableness of the position George Atkinson urged during 
negotiations; no one has an obligation to prove that a rejected 
proposal was fair or reasonable or should have been imposed by 
a court. The fact that another proposal was made does not make 
that proposal fair, better or worse than the settlement approv-
ed by the Court. 
To attempt to build a case of fraud in a court-
approved settlement on the fact that some other proposal was 
not accepted is to engage in chimera. No one knows or can 
establish what might have occurred had the Atkinsons refused 
any settlement other than that proposed by George Atkinson. 
IHC refused his terms and has no burden to show why it did not 
yield to them. 
No one knows at what point a refusal to compromise 
might have required court action by the Atkinsons. A jury 
might or might not have awarded $900,000 to their child. No 
one knows, and no one can know because there is no record of 
what might have been jlf. The Atkinsons1 argument requires the 
Court to indulge in speculation; that is improper in the judi-
cial process. 
3. The Atkinsons Chose Not to Be Represented by Counsel. 
IHC agrees with the position of Respondents Stephen 
G. Morgan and Morgan, Scalley & Reading in their response to 
the petition for rehearing. The Atkinsons consulted an attor-
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ney but chose not to retain one. They were, with the aid of 
themselves and Mr. Atkinson's father, able to get approximately 
$1 million; there is no evidence that they might have gotten 
another sum otherwise. They might have gotten less and could 
have incurred large legal fees. 
IHC also agrees that the Atkinsons have no claim of 
legal malpractice. An attorney representing one party when the 
other side chooses to appear pro se should be under no obliga-
tion to assist the pro se opponent as the Atkinsons urge. 
4. The Probate Court Made a Proper Determination» 
The Atkinsons' abdication of responsibility — their 
argument that they relied on the judge to be sure things were 
fair — raises several considerations. The first is that the 
Atkinsons, after conversing with an unidentified attorney, felt 
no need to sue because a settlement had been offered to them. 
The Atkinsons chose whether to offer the settlement for confir-
mation; they asked to be appointed guardians without bond for 
that purpose. (R. 421.) Their choices indicate their exercise 
of judgment and responsibility. After negotiating for a guar-
anteed $900,000, it is disingenuous for them now to claim that 
they relied on the judge to protect their child. 
But, even if the Atkinsons did rely on the court, 
there is no evidence that their reliance on the court was 
misplaced, nor is there any evidence to show that the probate 
judge was concerned with anything other than the child's prot-
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ection. The fact that the judge required the Atkinsons to post 
bond and file reports evidences the propriety and breadth of 
the judge's concern for the child. The Atkinsons' reliance on 
the judge does not require rehearing or reopening of the 
settlement. The Atkinsons have no proof that the settlement 
should not have been approved. 
5. Questioning the Judge Creates Serious Problems of Legal and 
Judicial Policy. 
Judge Fishier's resignation from the bench provided 
the parties with the unusual opportunity to obtain the affi-
davit and deposition of a judge who sat on a case. Although 
some situations exist in which judges have been questioned 
about their judicial tenure (e.g., when criminal charges have 
been filed), IHC respectfully submits that it is a dangerous 
precedent to permit a disgruntled litigant to question a judge 
as part of an appeal or a collateral attack on a judgment. The 
judicial process provides litigants with an appellate procedure 
and prescribed forms of collateral attack by rule and statute. 
To permit a judge — even one no longer active on the 
bench — to be questioned about the judicial process creates a 
sharp departure in legal proceedings and may be the precursor 
of naming judges as defendants and seeking to find them liable 
for a new claim of judicial malpractice. Judicial decisions 
should be challenged under settled principles of law and judi-
cial review, not on the recollections of judges about the 
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questions they asked or the thoughts they may have had in 
exercising their powers and applying their discretion. Such a 
departure in the judicial process should not develop from 
happenstance, A policy decision to modify the appellate 
process should arise from judicial rule or legislative enact-
ment; a constitutional amendment may be required. 
Despite the problems inherent in examining judicial 
memories, Judge Fishier's deposition and the affidavit give no 
reason why rehearing should be granted or why, ultimately, 
anyone should conclude that the settlement accepted by the 
Atkinsons for their child was not fair. Judge Fishier"s testi-
mony shows his proper judicial behavior with no violation of 
legal standard. 
6. The Affidavit of a Psychologist Should Carry No Weight, 
The affidavit of Richard King Mower offered by the 
Atkinsons in support of their petition should have no place in 
these proceedings. An attempt to raise a factual issue on a 
petition for rehearing is virtually unprecedented and certainly 
untimely. Moreover, the content of the affidavit offers 
nothing to assist the Court. It consists of quotations from 
court and deposition testimony and from this Court's decision, 
which Mr. Mower attempts to interpret. 
Research has yielded no precedent in which a psy-
chologist's analysis of a portion of the record has been 
substituted for the analysis of a judicial panel on a petition 
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for rehearing. The Atkinsons nowhere establish why Mr. Mower's 
inconclusive interpretation should be given deference or why 
his affidavit should be recognized by the Court on rehearing. 
Even if the Atkinsons' statements were to be inter-
preted as Mr. Mower suggests and even if Mr. Mower is accurate 
that a juror could join him or oppose him on the subjects about 
which he opines, his views fail to demonstrate a triable issue 
as to the underlying propriety of the settlement. In short, 
his statements, even if accepted as the views of an expert in 
psychology, fall far short of establishing anything with enough 
legal merit to justify further proceedings by this Court. His 
affidavit does not show any impropriety in the summary judg-
ment decision or in this Court's unanimous affirming opinion. 
Litigants should not be permitted to create or offer 
new facts or new disputes on a petition for rehearing, as the 
Atkinsons attempt with the Mower affidavit; this is another 
distortion of the appellate procedure and a distortion of the 
concept of "record". It is a distortion which cannot be per-
mitted without the approval of judicial rulemaking, legislative 
enactment or constitutional amendment. The judicial and appel-
late process should not so easily fall prey to untimely though 
imaginative efforts of counsel. 
7. There Is No Meritorious Constitutional Claim. 
Neither Mr. Mower's inconclusive views about the 
Atkinsons' statements nor his lay analysis of judicial reason-
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ing nor anything else argued by the Atkinsons creates a con-
stitutional issue at this untimely juncture. The standards for 
granting summary judgment are clear and were properly recog-
nized by this Court in affirming the trial court. Summary 
judgment has long been recognized as a proper and constitu-
tional means of resolving litigation, in no manner creating a 
denial of constitutional right to jury trial. Constitutional 
questions do not shine from the murky analysis and arguments of 
the Petitioners. 
8. Valid Justifications for Summary Judgment Remain Unscathed. 
The Atkinsons1 petition for rehearing purports to 
raise three issues about the case, none of which is valid, as 
demonstrated. The Atkinsons do not attack the numerous grounds 
for summary judgment which were previously argued and which 
still justify this Court's unanimous decision. The Atkinsons1 
attack on the settlement is barred by all possible limitations 
periods pertaining to medical malpractice claims. See Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 78-14-3(29), 78-14-8, 78-14-4(1). Their fraud and 
misrepresentation claims, insofar as they may be construed as 
separate from the underlying medical/injury claim, are barred 
by a three-year limitation period. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-
26(3). Their fraud and misrepresentation claims are further 
barred by their refusal to rescind the settlement agreement — 
they have received and continue to retain its benefits. The 
Atkinson's claims were previously settled in open court, so 
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this action is collaterally estopped. Searle Bros, v. Searle. 
588 P.2d 689 (Utah 1978), see also Robertson v. Campbell. 674 
P.2d 1226 (Utah 1983); Berry v. Berry. 738 P.2d 246 (Utah App. 
1987) . 
The evidence is uncontradicted that the Atkinsons 
refused an offer at no charge to have the child independently 
evaluated out of state. In open court, the Atkinsons ack-
nowledged that their child had brain damage. In open court, 
Mrs. Atkinson acknowledged that by settling they could not 
again claim against IHC, even if the child's condition wor-
sened. The release filed in open court recites the financial 
provisions of the settlement and also states that the extent 
and permanence of damage to the child may not be known. The 
parents acknowledged in open court that they believed their 
child had a claim, and Mr. Atkinson responded coherently when 
the $900,000 amount of the settlement was mentioned by the 
probate judge. All of these factors support summary judgment 
against the Atkinsons. 
There is no merit to any claim or argument by the 
Atkinsons to invalidate summary judgment against them; ample 
grounds for summary judgment exist and persist even against the 
speculative reasons the petitioners offer for reargument. 
CONCLUSION 
It is the mark of a competent and qualified judiciary 
that it attends carefully to allegations of error. However, a 
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mere allegation of error supported by purported facts raised 
post-appeal and alleged disputes over facts insufficient to 
prove the merits of an underlying claim do not justify reargu-
ment. The Atkinsons1 petition for reargument lacks merit and 
should be denied. IHC seeks such other and further relief, 
including costs, as may be just and proper. 
Dated: September 27, 1990. 
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